This paper analyzes the effects of progressive versus proportional taxation on capital gains realization behavior. Using a comprehensive panel of over 230,000 individuals in Sweden for , this paper shows after progressive capital gains taxes were cut from over 80% in the 1980s to a proportional tax rate of 30% in 1991, especially high-income taxpayers increased capital gains realizations. The reaction to the introduction of the proportional capital gains tax rate is more pronounced among younger individuals. This paper also shows that under a progressive (proportional) tax regime, investors with excess income are less (more) likely to realize capital gains than individuals with liquidity constraints. Hence, proportional versus progressive taxation plays an important role in capital gains realizations of private investors.
Introduction
The taxation of capital gains is one central feature of income tax systems around the world and offers one important potential channel of affecting the composition of income, distribution of realized capital gains and saving patterns over the life-cycle. Yet, tax authorities adapt a large variety of capital gains tax rules and tax capital gains either at the progressive marginal income tax rate (for example in Canada, Australia, and shortterm gains in the U.S.) or at a proportional tax rate (Finland, Japan or long-term gains in the U.S.).
1 Along with numerous income tax reforms over the past two decades, many tax authorities substantially revised capital gains taxation for example by broadening tax bases or introducing proportional tax rates.
The empirical relevance of progressive and proportional capital gains taxation and the influence on capital gains realizations have not been well tested. Despite the general agreement that taxes affect individual portfolio decisions, little is known about the impact of different tax regimes on capital gains realizations over the life-cycle. As capital gains are taxed upon realization, individuals are able to lower their effective tax burden by postponing the realization. This "lock-in effect" and its effect on trading decisions has been addressed in theoretical (see, among others, Constantinides, 1983; Auerbach, 1989 Auerbach, , 1991 Klein, 1999; Poterba, 2002; Shackelford and Verrecchia, 2002; Auerbach and Bradford, 2004) as well as empirical studies (for example Burman and Randolph, 1994; Lang and Shackelford, 2000; Seida and Wempe, 2000; Poterba and Weisbenner, 2001; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008 for the U.S. and Daunfeldt, Praski-Ståhlgren, and Rudholm, 2010 for Sweden). Most of the empirical studies on tax reforms focus on changes in marginal progressive tax rates (U.S.
tax reforms of 1987, 1997 and 2003) and are based on aggregated time-series data or firmdata without information on individual characteristics of the supply side such as income, wealth or demographic factors. 2 However, despite extensive research on capital gains tax-1 Capital gains tax rules additionally vary between countries with respect to the holding period (for example Australia, Denmark, and the U.S.) and share in equity (Austria, Germany, and Italy). That is, capital gains are taxed at higher rates if they are short-term and/or if they arise from disposal of substantial shareholdings.
2 There are some studies based on micro data. For example, Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005) use data on individual investments provided by a large discount broker house to analyze tax-motivated ation, the effects of progressive versus proportional tax rates on capital gains realizations remain disputed because of the lack of tax regime variation within one country. This paper uses the 1991 tax reform in Sweden to analyze the effect of progressive and proportional tax rates on capital gains realizations by individuals. In the early 1990s, the Scandinavian countries (Sweden in 1991 , Norway in 1992 , Finland in 1993 implemented dual income tax systems. The taxation of capital income at progressive income tax rates was reformed to a proportional capital tax for all individuals. The choice of Sweden and the 1991 tax reform offers a unique setting for three reasons: First, the most farreaching tax reform in the 20th century with a volume of six percent of gross domestic product (Agell, Englund, and Södersten, 1996) introduced a separate, flat-taxed schedule for capital income. After the reform, interest, dividends, and capital gains are taxed at a rate of 30% irrespective of the overall income. Second, as top marginal tax rates on capital income in Sweden fell from over 80% in the 1980s to a proportional tax of 30%, especially top incomes experienced a substantial tax cut on capital gains. Third, this study uses First, the sum of realized capital gains and the percentage of individuals realizing capital gains are highly correlated with the stock market development between 1973 and 1996. 1991 is an exception in this evolution: The share of individuals realizing capital gains as well as the sum of capital gains increase significantly despite the economic downturn and a negative stock market development with an average annual stock return of -18% in trading decisions and the "lock-in effect". However, this data set does not include information on individual income or demographic factors. Daunfeldt, Praski-Ståhlgren, and Rudholm (2010) use a comprehensive micro data set but lack identifying cross-sectional variation in capital gains tax rates between individuals during their sample period. Jacob (2010) uses two 10% random samples of all German income tax statements in 2001 and 2004 and shows that the propensity to realize capital losses (gains) increases (decreases) in the marginal (progressive) income tax rate on short-term capital gains.
1991. The aggregated time-series evaluation shows that the top percentile of the income distribution accounts for about 60% of the 1991 surge in aggregated capital gains. I further estimate differences in capital gains realization activity around the 1991 reform and add controls for income, wealth, demographic factors, and regional disparities for two samples of six and twelve years around the tax reform. The estimated magnitudes are large. After the reform, capital gains realization activity increased by 1.6 (2.9) percentage points in the six (twelve) year period around the reform. These effects equal 32% (62%) of the unconditional prereform average. In contrast, average capital gains fell by SEK 18,039 (SEK 46, 163) . Furthermore, the 1991 reform has a substantial impact on the distribution of realized capital gains among individuals. In the 1970s and 1980s, the top percentile (top decile) of the income distribution realizes about 13% (20%) of all capital gains without significant time trend. After the reform, the share of the top percentile (decile) surges by 22 percentage points (15 percentage points). As a result, the concentration of realized capital gains among high incomes is substantially larger under the proportional tax.
Second, to account for the economic situation in Sweden in the early 1990s, I explore the tax response by analyzing the heterogeneity of the effect across individuals. Individuals in the top marginal tax bracket had the strongest incentive to realize capital gains.
I turn to parametric tests in the form of linear regressions which simultaneously estimate the response of different income percentiles to the tax reform. These regressions allow for more detailed controls and include county as well as individual fixed effects. As expected, higher income percentiles increase their postreform realization activity to a larger extent than investors in the lower income percentiles. Thanks to the panel structure and the large number of observations, I am able to estimate effects for each income percentile.
The effect of the reform on the likelihood to realize capital gains increases in the income percentile. These effects are robust to several additional tests. To address concerns that the reaction to the reform is simply a one-time effect, I estimate the effects without 1991. A simple life-cycle model of consumption and savings (see, for instance, Browning (1995), Carroll (1997) , Gourinchas and Parker (2002) , Gomes and Michaelides (2005) as well as Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Attanasio and Weber (2010) for literature overviews) integrates three different motives that have been empirically identified. First, younger individuals buffer stocks for precautionary reasons.
Second, individuals safe for their retirement to maintain their working-life labor income.
Third, individuals dissave when they are old. Prior to the reform, individuals have an incentive to postpone capital gains until retirement when they face lower marginal tax rates. Under a proportional tax, the benefits from postponing realizations are much lower as investors face the same nominal tax rate over their life-cycle. The comprehensive panel data allows analyzing these effects. Before 1991, capital gains realizations increase in age and are in line with the simple life-cycle model. 26% of individuals aged 60 to 70 in the top percentile of the income distribution realize capital gains in the 1988-1990 sample.
The fraction is 5.4 percentage points lower among 30 to 40-year-olds. After the reform, realization activity between old and young individuals converges. The estimated effects after controlling for income, wealth, and demographics are large. For the six (twelve) year period around 1991, the likelihood that 30 to 40-year-olds realize capital gains surges by 15.9 (23.3) percentage points -a 9.2 (8.9) percentage points higher increase than for the 60 to 70-year-olds. This suggests that the age of the average investor realizing capital gains is significant lower when capital gains are taxes at proportional as opposed to progressive rates.
Finally, I examine the role of liquidity constraints at the individual level around the 1991 tax reform. In general, the likelihood that individuals realize accrued capital gains is higher when current income is below average income. Apart from compensating such liquidity constraints by selling assets, temporary lower capital gains additionally incentivize individuals to realize capital gains. In contrast, if current income exceeds the average income, temporary higher tax rates can "lock-in" accrued capital gains. However, both tax effects are irrelevant under a proportional tax. The longitudinal character of the data set allows the identification of these effects. When sorting by the deviation of current income from the average income of the three preceding years I find that individuals with liquidity constraints (current income<average income) are more likely to realize capital gains than individuals with excess income (current income>average income) under progressive taxation. The estimated effects are again large. For the top percentile (top decile) of the income distribution, the likelihood of realizing capital gains increases by 22.6 (25.3) percentage points if the individual has lower current income as opposed to excess income. This relation changes after 1991. In fact, individuals with excess income are now more likely to realize capital gains than individuals with temporary lower income. The difference estimate between both groups with control variables is 18.7 (13.5) percentage points. The reasons for this result are twofold. First, individuals with excess income increase capital gains realization activity as they are not locked-in by temporary higher tax rates. Second, individuals with liquidity constraints cut capital gains realizations by about 13% of the prereform average. This test shows that the motive behind capital gains realizations appears to differ substantially between proportional and progressive taxation.
The results have major implications for policy makers. Apart from finding evidence of the "lock-in" effect of capital gains taxation, this paper shows that a fundamental change in capital gains taxation and the introduction of a proportional capital gains tax rate significantly affects the distribution of realized capital gains. Progressive taxation locks-in capital gains of tax sensitive, rich individuals. In contrast, a proportional tax increases concentration of realized capital gains among top incomes. Second, the transition of a progressive to proportional capital gains taxation substantially affects capital gains realizations over the life-cycle and the timing of capital gains. Individuals' capital gains tax planning activities become less important under proportional taxation. Consequently, motives behind capital market transactions, for example the importance of liquidity constraints, differ between proportional and progressive taxation. The remainder of this paper is in five sections. In Section 2, I briefly discuss the 1991 tax reform and the data. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics of the evolution of capital gains in Sweden. Section 4 analyzes the impact of the 1991 tax reform on selling activity and timing of capital gains realizations. Section 5 finally concludes.
The Swedish Tax Reform and Data

The 1991 Tax Reform
In 1991, Sweden thoroughly revised the income tax system and moved away from a global income system to a dual income tax. The latter taxes earned income such as labor or pensions separately from capital income (see Sørensen, 1994 , for an overview). The reform was heavily discussed in the late 1980s and finally signed in 1990. The old tax system encouraged tax avoidance and tax planning, for example by shifting income among family members.
4 For many years, net revenue from capital taxes was negative as especially individuals in the top marginal income tax bracket deducted interest expenses against highly taxed labor income (Agell, Englund, and Södersten, 1996) . In contrast, income from capital assets, particularly owner-occupied housing, was tax-preferred with low imputed rents and generous indexation schemes. The 1991 tax reform reduced (global) marginal income tax rates from 36-72% to a progressive tax rate of 31-51% on earned income and to a proportional tax rate of 30% on capital income. Furthermore, the corporate tax rate was lowered from 52% to 30%. The Swedish tax authority further substantially broadened tax bases and eliminated various tax shelters and loopholes in the income as well as the corporate tax code.
The introduction of the proportional tax of 30% implied dramatic changes in the taxation of capital gains. Prior to the reform, the individual's marginal income tax rate and the holding period determined the capital gains tax burden on listed shares. period to avoid overlapping effects with changing stock market activity in Sweden. In 1997, the first online bank opened and transaction costs declined substantially in the following years.
Data
6 Information on wealth is only available if the total wealth exceeds a certain threshold which for example amounted to 900,000 Swedish Kronor (SEK) in 2000. This converts into 98,127 USD using the 2000 average exchange rate of 9.1718 SEK/USD. and income volatility that are not within the 0.01st and the 99.9th percentile of observations. As there were major changes in the tax legislation from 1980 to 1985 (see among others Södersten, 1993) , I restrict regression analyses to the 1985-1996 period. 1985 is a reasonable choice for the start of the prereform period to ensure an almost constant capital gains tax regime for the analyses in Section 3 and 4. Demographic controls include eleven variables (see also Sodini 2009a, 2009b; Daunfeldt, Praski-Ståhlgren, and Rudholm 2010) . T own t is an indicator T own is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in towns (usually) with less than 10,000 inhabitants and equal to 0 otherwise. City is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants and equal to 0 otherwise. Capital is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in the county's capital and equal to 0 otherwise. Age is the individual's age in years. M arried is an indicator variable equal to 100 if the individual is married and equal to 0 otherwise. Household Size represents the number of family members in the household. HS Inc (HS Dec) is an indicator variable equal to 100 if the household size increases (decreases) from t − 1 to t and 0 otherwise. BusInc is an indicator variable equal to 100 if the individual generates income from business activity and 0 otherwise. SocAss (P ension) is an indicator variable equal to 100 if the individual receives social assistance (pension) and 0 otherwise. is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in cities (municipality codes ending in 80 to 99 -"stad") and equal to 0 otherwise. Capital t is an indicator variable equal to 100 for individuals residing in the county's capital and equal to 0 otherwise. The 1991 reform led to a surge in aggregated capital gains of 60.5% from SEK 7.4 billion to SEK 11.9 billion despite a 18% decline in the Swedish stock market index. The effect of the 1991 reform is stronger for the top percentile of the income distribution.
Dependent and Independent Variables
Panel A: Capital Gains Variables
Aggregated capital gains more than tripled from SEK 0.82 billion to SEK 3.56 billion. .8 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 Top Percentile
Fraction of Total Captial Gains
Top Decile P0 to P90
On average, the top 1% of the income distribution realizes almost one quarter of total capital gains over the 1973-1996 period. But, the role of top percentile and top decile in capital gains realizations changes after the tax reform as shown in Figure 2 . Under the progressive tax regime, both, the top percentile and the top decile have a constant share of around 13.4% and 20% respectively without significant trend. The share of total realized capital gains increases significantly after the reform. The surge amounts to 15
percentage points for the top decile and to 22 percentage points for the top percentile to reach a constant level after the reform. 9 As of 1996, the top percentile, the top decile and the remaining 90% of the population contribute almost similar shares to total capital gains realizations.
However, the trend in aggregated realized capital gains can result from the increasing number of people accessing stock and housing markets. When a larger fraction of individuals sell shares and real estate, the total sum of income from capital gains is expected to increase because more individuals will realize capital gains. 
Effects of the 1991 Reform
Interpreting time series of aggregated and average capital gains as well as capital gains realization cannot provide precise estimates of tax effects when relevant controls such as wealth, income volatility, family size, financial expertise, and age are excluded. Furthermore, capital gains are very concentrated (see Figure 2 and Roine and Waldenström (2011) ). The top percentile accounts for about one quarter of all realized capital gains from 1973 through 1996. I therefore additionally examine a six-year as well as a twelveyear period around the 1991 reform and integrate relevant control variables to ensure robust estimates of changes in capital gains realizations. [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . The sample consists of 234,406 individuals and 1,281,819 observations. Panel B covers the twelve-year period around the tax reform (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) . The second sample consists of 258,382 individuals and 2,564,277 observations. Standard errors of the differences with and without controls (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by county-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: 1988-1993
Prereform Postreform Difference (postDifference with 1988-1990 1991-1993 minus prereform) controls (1) (2) (3) The numbers are based on the assumption that no other unobservable determinants of capital gains realization activity changed during the respective time horizon. However, this assumption does not hold given the economic crisis and the fundamental tax reform in 1991 that effectively lowered capital gains tax rates for individuals in the top tax bracket.
To ensure robustness of differences between post-and prereform capital gains realizations, I control for a rich set of variables using the comprehensive longitudinal panel data set. I run the following regression for the capital gains variables:
where CG i,t is the respective capital gains measure of individual i in year t. P ost t is a dummy variable for the post reform period taking the value 1 after the enactment of the The fourth column of Table 2 shows that results for the difference after controls (β) between postreform and prereform differences in capital gains realizations and initiations in Panel A are similar. Adding controls, the estimate of before-and-after difference is 1.6 percentage points -32% of the unconditional prereform average. In Panel B, the difference with controls is smaller than without controls but still economically significant.
In the six years following the reform, the likelihood of realizing capital gains increases by 2.85 percentage points or 69.5% of the unconditional prereform average. The first concern pertains the long-run responsiveness to a cut in capital gains tax rates. The existing literature on capital gains reaches consensus that short-run elasticity to capital gains tax rates is substantially larger than the long-run elasticity (see, among others, Eichner and Sinai, 2000) . One might expect that the reaction to the reform is substantially lower when observations from 1991 and 1994 are excluded. The results in Column 1, however, show that the estimate for the 1988-1993 sample is very similar. For the 1985-1996 sample, the effect (after controls) is even stronger when 1991 and 1994 are
excluded. It appears that the significant long-run effect of lower capital gains tax rates largely stems from transition of a progressive capital gains tax to a proportional tax.
Another central concern about the results is the large heterogeneity within groups with respect to income composition, demographic characteristics, and asset allocation.
Individuals and households respond differently to economic downturn and tax reforms.
So far, the error term picks up some of this heterogeneity. Therefore, I restrict my sample to more homogeneous subpopulations. Column 2 reports difference estimates for 4 Who responded to the Tax Reform?
High Income Taxpayers and Capital Gains Responses
The section now turns to the question of who responded to the 1991 reform. The tax cut incentivized especially individuals in the top marginal tax bracket to increase their capital gains realization activity. Their marginal tax burden on short-term capital gains fell from over 70% to 30%. Taxpayers in lower tax brackets benefit from a substantial, albeit weaker tax cut on short-term capital gains. In contrast, they face a higher tax rate on long-term capital gains after the reform. In line with earlier evidence on the "lock-in" effect (see, among others, Reese, 1998; Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner, 2005; Dai, Maydew, Shackelford, and Zhang, 2008) , I expect that the change in capital gains realization activity increases in income. This prediction is tested with the following linear regression model:
where CG i,t is the respective capital gains measure of individual i in year t. The indicator variable P51-60 takes the value 1 if the individual i is within the sixth decile of the income distribution in year t and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable P61-70 refers to individuals in the seventh decile of the income distribution and so forth. The group P100 includes all individuals that are within the top percentile of the income distribution in year t. The vectors I and X and the indicator P ost t are defined as in Equation (1). In all regression specifications, I employ county-fixed effects (County) and fixed effects at the individual level (α i ). In the regressions, I expect the β coefficients to increase if, as hypothesized, the postreform surge in capital gains realization activity increases in income. Table 4 summarizes coefficient estimates for β 1 to β 7 , standard errors, and t-statistics of differences between β n and β n−1 . Individuals in all income cohorts significantly increased their realization activity. As expected, beta coefficients increase in income and are significantly different from each other. The response to the tax reform is strongest in higher income percentiles. The probability that an individual in the top percentile realizes capital gains increases by 16.32 (23.54) percentage points from 1989-1990 to 1991-1993 (from 1985-1990 to 1991-1996) . The response of the 91st to the 99th percentile is economically significant (9.13 percentage points in Panel A and 15.77 in Panel B) but weaker in comparison to the top income percentile. As expected, the lowest response to the tax reform is estimated for the lowest deciles of the income distribution. I repeat the six robustness tests from above for Equation (2) to address some of the heterogeneity in the data, the inference of the economic crisis, and possible one-time effects of tax reforms. The results are presented in Table A .1 and A.2 and show very similar trends in the reaction to the reform.
An alternative approach to the simultaneous regression can be used if one is concerned about serial correlation at the individual level. I therefore divide individuals into 100 in-come percentiles and regress the effect of P ost separately for each subsample. The results for the β coefficients on the propensity to realize capital gains are illustrated in Figure   6 . The estimated coefficients are normalized by the unconditional prereform averages.
This approach ensures that the results are not misinterpreted. Absolute changes do not recognize differences in stock market participation and prereform realization activity.
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By normalizing with prereform averages, the estimates reflect relative changes in realization behavior and ensure comparability of results. I then regress the resulting relative increases against the percentile rank. Hence, I simply treat relative coefficients as data points. The effect increases in income percentile rank. The linear regression yields a point estimate of 0.0146 and a very high t-statistic. The R-squared of the hundred-data-point regression is 85.45%. Again, one could be concerned that this pattern is driven by the economic crisis.
If the reaction to the crisis was concentrated among rich and sophisticated investors, I
would misinterpret crisis effects as tax effects. I address this concern by repeating the percentilewise regressions around the stock market crash around 2001. To control for changing payout policies on the stock market, Table A after the respective tax cut. However, the results for the difference-in-difference estimate are insignificant for both, the 1991 and the 1994 tax cut.
14 This is consistent with the prediction that individuals sells shares at the lower (temporary) capital gains tax rate and reinvest the free cash flow in stocks.
Effects on Life Cycle
Having established the result that there is a positive relationship between income and the reaction the 1991 tax reform, I turn to important tests on the timing of capital gains over the life-cycle under different tax regimes. A simple life-cycle model of consumption and savings (see, for instance, Attanasio and Browning (1995) , Carroll (1997) , Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Attanasio and Weber (2010) To address concerns that the results in Figure 8 are influenced by other confounding factors Table 5 presents results of detailed analyses of capital gains realizations before (column 1) and after (column 2) the reform as well as the difference (column 3) for different age cohorts in the top income percentile. Column 4 presents estimates for differences between post-and prereform realization activity with control variables (see Equation period around the tax reform.
In both panels, the realization activity increases in age prior to the reform. 26% (23%) of all individuals aged 60 to 70 realize capital gains in the 1988-1990 (1985-1990) sample.
The fraction is 5.4 (5.9) percentage points lower among the 30 to 40-year-olds. After the reform however, the difference between older and younger individuals diminishes. In Panel A, the youngest evaluated group shows the highest realization activity. In Panel B, the difference between the oldest and the youngest drops to 2.3 percentage points.
Column four shows that results are very similar with control variables. The realization activity between older and younger individuals among the top percentile converges. In Panel A (Panel B), the difference between post-and prereform realization activity for the 30 to 40-year-olds amounts to 15.9 (23.3) percentage points -9.2 (8.9) percentage points higher than for the 60 to 70-year-olds. Table 6 presents the results from five different robustness tests for 1988-1993 and 1985-1996 period. In Column (1), the reaction of different age cohorts is estimated simul- This table reports the average capital gain realizations, initiations, terminations and realized values prereform (column 1) and postreform (column 2), as well as estimates of the change between the two periods with (column 3) and without controls (column 4). Panel A covers six years around the 1991 tax reform (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) . The sample consists of 234,406 individuals and 1,281,819 observations. Panel B covers the twelve-year period around the tax reform (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) . The second sample consists of 258,382 individuals and 2,564,277 observations. Standard errors of the differences with and without controls (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by county-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Top Percentile 1988-1993
Prereform Postreform Difference (post-Difference with 1988-1990 1991-1993 (4) present results for the top percentile of the income distribution. Column (3) to (5) present estimates for the top decile. Columns (1) and (4) presents coefficient estimates for age specific differences from fixed-effect panel regressions including all individuals aged less than 70. In Column (2) and (5), observations from 1991 and 1994 have been excluded from the separately estimated age cohort effects. Column (3) replicates the differences with controls from Table 5 but uses the sample of individuals in the top decile. Standard errors of the differences with and without controls (reported in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity and are clustered by county-years. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance of the difference at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. All regressions include control variables as in equation (2 (1.738)*** (1.614)*** (1.987)*** taneously and not separately as in Table 5 . In Column (2), I address concerns that the reaction is a one-time effect in 1991 and 1994. Both tests yield the same pattern. Younger individuals respond more strongly to the reform than individuals who are retired or close to retirement. In Column (3) to (5), I repeat the baseline regressions from Column (4) in Table 5 rates. Thus, it appears that there are structural differences on capital markets between tax regimes as for example risk-taking, diversification and trading activity significantly differs among age cohorts (see Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2009a,b) .
Capital Gains as Transitory Income Component
Finally, I examine the role of liquidity constraints at the individual level. If individuals face a temporary low income, they might realize accrued capital gains and smooth income to maintain their level of consumption. Apart from the incentive to overcome temporary liquidity constraints by selling capital gains assets, progressive taxation strengthens this tendency (see, for example, Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Stiglitz, 1983) . If the temporary tax rate is significantly lower than the average, permanent tax rate an investor can effectively lower his capital gains tax burden by realizing capital gains in years with liquidity constraints. In contrast, if an investor has a higher income than usual, he is less likely to realize capital gains as capital gains are additionally locked-in by the tax wedge be- Table A .5 in the Appendix). Current income is about 25% lower than average income over the preceding three years. Individuals with temporary high income have an average income of SEK 489.908. This is 26.59% higher than on average. Table A .4 in the Appendix).
17 As robustness checks, I tested different cutoffs (5%, 20%). Results (not reported) are very similar. 18 For the top percentile, average income is significantly higher. On average income is SEK 549.853 (temporarily low income) and SEK 887.124 respectively (temporarily high income). For individuals with liquidity constraints (excess income), current income is about 28.63% (29.09%) lower (higher) than on average. 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Year 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 for the top percentile. After the reform, this relation changes substantially. Individuals with temporary high income significantly increased capital gains realizations as they are not additionally locked-in by temporary high tax rates under the proportional tax scheme.
In contrast, individuals with lower current income cut capital gains realizations. Table   7 presents difference estimates between both groups and periods where I additionally control for income, wealth and demographic factors as in equation (1).
Prior to the reform, the difference with controls between individuals with temporary low and high income amounts to -22.62 percentage points -140% the unconditional mean of prereform realization activity of individuals with high temporary income. This difference is even stronger for the top decile of the income distribution -more than three times the prereform average of 8%. One reason for the stronger effect in the top decile is the progressive tax scheme. Individuals in the top decile are more likely to face kinks in the tax code than taxpayer in the top percentile.
The differences between pre-and postreform period are negative for individuals with 
Conclusion
This paper has shown that progressive versus proportional taxation affects capital gains realization behavior. Using a comprehensive panel data set from 1973-1996 I show that: 1) the likelihood to realize capital gains increases after the introduction of the proportional tax, 2) the reaction to the reform is more pronounced among high-income individuals, 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Bottom Quintile Top Quintile This table presents coefficient estimates for differences in post-and prereform capital gain realizations for the 1985-1996 sample. The first group accumulates the lowest five deciles (P0-P50). The next groups refer to the sixth to ninth decile of the income distribution. The sixth group consists of the 91st to 99th percentile. Finally, the last group consists of individuals in the top percentile. β i is the coefficient estimate for the post-reform effect in group i. In Column (1), observations from 1991 and 1994 have been excluded from the regressions. In Column (2), the sample is restricted to individuals with constant income. Observations where income changes by more than 15% are excluded. Column (3) combines restrictions from Column (1) and (2). Results in Column (4) are based on the sample of individuals with constant income, exlcuding the years 1991 and 1994, and all individuals younger than 30 or older than 60. Column (5) includes control variables for relevance of interest deduction. In Column (6), the sample is restricted to 
